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CONTENTS
• The cyclical situation at the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is favorable: The upswing in Euro-
land has strengthened, unemployment is going down, and inflation remains low. However, the economic condi-
tions outside the new currency area have deteriorated significantly during 1998. Fears are mounting that the cri-
ses in various regions of the world economy could endanger the current expansion in Euroland.
• The most important determinants of Euroland exports into third countries are economic activity abroad and the
real exchange rate. The empirical investigation shows that a one percent increase of industrial production abroad
raises Euroland's exports by 0.7 percent in the long run, while the positive effect of a one percent real deprecia-
tion amounts to about 0.5 percent. The relevance of export fluctuations for the business cycle in Euroland is
smaller than for individual countries like Germany; compared to the United States and Japan, however, they are
of greater importance. Nevertheless, Euroland is less affected by the Asian crisis than the United States.
• Economic policy often relies on estimates of potential output growth and the output gap. Various measures lead
to similar conclusions concerning the growth rate of potential output in Euroland. Also, the timing of cyclical turn-
ing points is more or less the same. All procedures imply that capacity utilization increased in the course of 1997
and also in the first half of 1998. Although there is some uncertainty with respect to the precise level of the output
gap, one can conclude that capacity utilization is back to normal again in Euroland. If monetary and fiscal policy
were to become more stimulative now, there would be the risk of cyclical tensions.
• The policy of central banks in Euroland continues to stimulate economic activity. The decline in the difference
between long-term and short-term interest rates is due to a marked decrease in long-term rates and does not re-
flect monetary tightening. The continued acceleration of money growth also points at an expansionary policy
stance. A turnaround of monetary policy is not likely in the near future. We expect that by the end of 1998, money-
market rates will converge at the level currently prevailing in Germany.
• After the decisions on EMU membership, the policy of fiscal consolidation did not continue. This year's slight fur-
ther decline in the deficit ratio for Euroland, which was reduced between 1996 and 1997 from 4.1 percent to 2.5
percent, is not due to additional consolidation efforts but rather to the improved cyclical situation. Given that the
Maastricht Treaty calls for a sustainable fiscal position and the Stability and Growth Pact requires the budgets to
be at least balanced over a cycle, the current course of fiscal policy in Euroland is not compatible with the targets
laid down in the treaties.
• Real GDP in Euroland will rise by nearly 3 percent in both 1998 and 1999, which implies a considerable increase
in capacity utilization. While export growth will weaken due to the combined dampening effects from the Asian
and Russian crises and the cyclical deceleration in the United States and the United Kingdom, domestic demand
will further gain momentum. Private investment will be particularly buoyant on the back of rising capacity utiliza-
tion, rapid profit growth, and low interest rates. Consumer prices will rise by some 1.5 percent this year. As damp-
ening factors like falling raw material prices will slowly fade, inflation will pick up somewhat in the course of 1999.
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The cyclical situation at the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is favorable: The up-
swing in Euroland has firmed, unemployment is going down, and inflation is low. However, economic
growth outside the new currency area has weakened significantly during 1998, and fears are mounting
that the crises in various regions of the world economy could endanger the current expansion in Euro-
land. Against this background, the significance of external conditions for the business cycle in Euro-
land — as well as the regional structure of exports — is analyzed. An important issue for an adequate
design of economic policy is to what extent capacities in Euroland are currently utilized and whether
cyclical unemployment is still significant. In addition, it is important to know whether the business
cycles in the individual countries converge or not. In light of the findings from these analyses, the
course of monetary, fiscal, and wage policy is evaluated in order to assess the outlook for Euroland
until the end of 1999.
1 Upswing Boosted by Domestic Demand
The upswing in Euroland has continued in the course of this year; the momentum has remained more
or less the same compared to the second half of last year. During the first half of 1998, real GDP in-
creased at an annual rate of almost 3 percent (Figure 1). While export growth, which had been buoyant
in 1997, decelerated considerably, domestic demand expanded at a more rapid pace. This is mainly
due to the impulses from economic policy: While monetary policy has remained stimulative, fiscal
policy has not dampen economic activity anymore as in the previous year.
The driving force of the upswing has been private investment, stimulated by low interest rates, im-
proved sales and profit expectations, and the increase of capacity utilization. Private consumption has
continued to recover in the course of this year at a rate roughly in line with GDP growth. Real
disposable income has expanded more rapidly — due to gains in employment and the rise in real in-
come resulting from the decline of inflation. In addition, taxes and social contributions were not raised
again as in previous years.
Export growth lost momentum due to the drastic fall of the demand from Asia, the region that had
shown exceptional growth in the years before. Also, the improvement in Russia, which had set in last
year, did not continue. Real imports of Euroland expanded more rapidly than real exports; due to the
improvement in the terms of trade, however, the current account surplus hardly changed in 1998.
The upturn has led to an improvement on the labor market in almost all countries of the future
European Monetary Union; the exception is Italy. While there are still considerable differences be-
tween the national economies, the unemployment rate in Euroland declined by about half a percentage
point during the first half of 1998 reaching some 11 percent.
Inflation has continued to be very moderate. Consumer prices in Euroland have risen only slightly,
producer prices even have declined in recent months. On the one hand, import prices have fallen as
raw material prices plunged and the European currencies revalued considerably against Asian cur-
rencies. On the other hand, internal inflation has remained subdued. However, a divergent develop-
ment has emerged here: In those countries which have experienced relatively high GDP growth for
quite a long time CPI inflation has accelerated in spite of the dampening factors from abroad; in other
countries, inflation has declined. The inflation differential has thus increased considerably; on the
basis of the harmonized CPI (Box 1), the rates in Portugal and Ireland are about 2 percentage points
higher than the rates in Austria, Germany, and France.
1
In the forecast table, we continue to use the national price index because it still gets more attention in the public; for
































































1996 1997. ^ 1998
Consumer Prices' f'^
11996, 1997 1998
alndicators seasonally adjusted. — ^Percentage change over previous quarter (annual rate). — °For Germany,
France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands. — dExcluding intra-Euroland trade. — ;
eChange within the last six months at
annual rates.
Source: Eurostat (1998); Europaische Kommission (1998a, 1998b); OECD (1998a, 1998b); Datastream; own estimates.
focus on the HCPI because it is not only based on a unified method but will most likely also be used by the European
Central Bank as an indicator.Box I: On the Measurement of Inflation in Euroland
Since January 1997, the statistical office of the European Community (EUROSTAT) has published the harmonized
consumer price i'n'dex (HCPI) for the 15 member states and for Norway and Iceland. According to the Europaische
Kommission (1998a: 20), the HCPI should measure the inflation rates of the different countries in a comparable way.
The harmonized consumer price index comprises a smaller basket of goods compared to the national indices. The share of
the recorded expenditures relative to the total expenditures(recorded share) reaches from 79.5 percent in the Netherlands to
97.4 percent in Greece.
a Mainly hypothetical rents for owner-occupied housing or mortgage payments as a proxy for
housing costs are excluded. Furthermore, expenditures for health and education are partly not included in the HCPI. During
the last years, the goods of these expenditure categories have become more expensive relative to the goods that are in-
cluded in the HCPI. Therefore, the inflation rates calculated on the basis of the national indices are slightly higher than the
rates calculated on the basis of the harmonized indices. Some further deviations result from the different methods of
including new products (Statistisches Bundesamt 1997: 188). In most cases, the differences between the national indices
and the HCPI are rather small.b




























































































aThe HCPI will be expanded in two steps until December 1999, so that the share of goods included both in the national and
in the harmonized price indices will vary between 83 percent (Netherlands) and 100 percent (France, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Finland). — bThe differences for the United Kingdom and Sweden, however, are substantial. —
 cBased on GDP weights,
calculated in current prices and exchange rates in 1997.
In Spite of the Large Currency Area: Great Importance of International Trade
During the last 15 months, a financial and economic crisis has emerged in an increasing number of
countries. The exports of Euroland into the regions of crisis declined considerably in the course of
1998. However, the expansion of overall economic activity did not decelerate. This may suggest that
the business cycle in a large currency area like EMU is determined by domestic forces. However, it
may also be true that the crisis is confined to regions which are not very important for the export in-
dustries of Euroland. In the following, we analyze the importance of international trade for Euroland
in general and take a look at the regional distribution of exports and imports as well.Euroland is a new economic entity; the analysis of exports and imports therefore has to focus on
trade with third countries.
2 As opposed to the data published by Eurostat, we refer to the trade between
Euroland as a whole and the rest of the world; consequently, the trade among EMU countries is
defined as intra-trade.
3 In order to determine the level of Euroland's exports one would have to deduct
the intra-trade figures from the official trade data included in the National Income Accounts. However,
this is not possible because of the lack of data. Therefore, the share of the intra-trade of exports and
imports of Euroland is approximated by the national intra-trade shares.
4 These calculated series of
intra-trade in Euroland show a marked cyclical pattern. In addition, exports to and imports from third
countries expanded more rapidly than the trade within Euroland in the 1990s. This is due to the higher
economic growth abroad and also to the increasing integration of newly industrialized countries and
countries in transition (Figure 2).
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aExports, imports and intra-trade (based on exports) at constant prices of 1990, seasonally adjusted.
An export equation is estimated in order to analyze the determinants of Euroland's exports (Box 2).
As expected, the volume of exports is positively affected by an increase of economic activity abroad
and by a real devaluation of the ecu (Figure 3). In the long run, a one percent increase in foreign
industrial production raises exports by 0.7 percent, while a real depreciation of the ecu by one percent
raises exports by about 0.5 percent. Changes in the real value of the ecu, which can also be expected
for the future due to the system of flexible exchange rates, have a substantial impact on exports.
As far as intra-trade and external trade is concerned, a separate calculation exists only for special trade but not for trade
with services, which amounts to more than one-fifth of external trade. The official NIA data provided by Eurostat for
Euroland are simply the sum of exports and of imports of the respective individual countries.
Intra-exports and intra-imports are identical by definition, so no difference is made here. In practice, however, there are
considerable differences because exports and imports are reported by different persons. In this article,'the series used is
based on exports as they seem to be more reliable. ' - -"•-•--
The calculation is performed by using the national shares of intra-trade. Since the data on the special trade of Euroland
regarding intra-trade and trade with the rest of the world are not available as a long time series, the necessary shares are
calculated on the basis of the ITCS database of the OECD. For services, we assume that the regional distribution is the
same as for special trade. For details, see StrauB (1998b).Figure 3: Determinants of Euroland's Exports, 1981-1998
.a
Industrial production abroad
Real external value of the ecu
-20-1 ' I ' ' ' 1 | i i i | i i i j i i i
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
aPercent change over previous year. — ^See Box 2.
The effect of total exports on total production in an economy depends on the relative importance of
exports. The Lundberg component is an appropriate measure as it relates both variables; therefore, one
can compare the importance across countries. Statistically, the importance of exports for changes in
GDP is a lot smaller for Euroland than for Germany, but it is higher than for Japan or for the United
States (Figure 4).
5 The result is similar if the Lundberg components are calculated for net exports.
Furthermore, the contribution of exports to GDP growth for Euroland is higher than for the other two
economies;
6 this tendency even increased in the course of the 1990s. The degree of openness — de-
fined as the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP — confirms the findings: While the
importance of the rest of the world is lower for Euroland than for the individual EMU countries, it
exceeds that of the United States and Japan (Table 1). However, among the 11 countries, there are also
The standard deviation of the Lundberg components of exports since the beginning of the 1980s is 0.64 for Euroland,
0.50 for the United States, 0.51 for Japan, and 1.38 and 1.40 for Western Germany and Germany, respectively.
The means of the Lundberg components since 1981 amount to 0.74 for Euroland, 0.60 for the United States, 0.57 for
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aPercentage change of the relation between the absolute change in real exports and real GDP of the preceding
period.
Box 2: An Estimation of Euroland's Exports
According to the international trade literature the main determinants of exports are economic activity abroad, price competitive-
ness, and — in more recent studies — the growing international division of labor. In order to find out the influence of industrial
production abroad
8 (I) and of the real external value of the ecub (e) On Euroland's real exports (X), we have run a regression using
seasonnally adjusted quarterly data from 1987/1 to 1997/III. The trend variable is to reflect the growing integration of international
trade. The equation shows the rates of change over the previous quarter, hence coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. An
error-correction type estimation yields the following results (r-values in parentheses):
A In X, = 2.78- 0.69 | In X,^ - 0.68 In /,_, + 0.54 In e,_, -0.01361\- 0.27 41nX,_3
(4.40) (-6.93)L (-5.61) (4.31) (-16.69) J (-2.78)
+ 1.88 41n/,_!- 0.55 A In e, + 0.27 A In e,_4 + 0.05 D
8711
1 + u,.
(6.12) (-5.82) (2.53) (3.32)
The expression in brackets represents a stable long-term equilibrium (significance level of cointegration: 1 percent). The residuals
are homoscedastic, free of autocorrelation and follow a normal distribution. The Cusum and Cusum-of-squares tests do not reveal
any evidence for structural change. The dummy variable needed for technical reasons is 1 in 1987 III, 0 else. The adjusted R
2
amounts to 0.70.
The long-run elasticity with respect to industrial production abroad is 0.68 and is lower than the values found for individual
countries, which usually are higher than unity (see Lapp et al. (1995: 11) for the G7-countries, Dopke and Fischer (1994: 59-60),
Boss et al. (1997: 277), and StrauB (1998a: 164-165) for Germany). However, the trend and the intercept show bigger coefficients.
This discrepancy, among other reasons, stems from the higher
0 weight of emerging markets in Euroland's exports compared to
single EMU member states; because of deepening market penetration by European firms, exports to newly industrialized countries
continued to rise sharply even in times of temporary stagnation in industrial production. The globalization of production processes
also makes exports grow at a stronger pace than industrial production by pushing trade in intermediate products. As the sample
period in the studies mentioned generally starts in 1980 or earlier, these more recent phenomena have a stronger impact on the
estimation presented here. Furthermore, sufficiently long time series are not available for Central and Eastern Europe; this is why
the rapid evolution of sales to this region can only be reflected by the trend variable. Unlike the constant term and the long-run pro-
duction elasticity, the long-run exchange-rate elasticitiy as well as the short-term adjustment rather confirm the results of other
studies.
aIndex of industrial production in the following 22 countries: United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Norway,
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, South Africa, Korea, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and India. These countries absorb more than 70 percent of Euroland's exports. — bQeometric aver-
age of the real external value of the ecu relative to 19 currencies (those of the countries mentioned above except Brazil, Chinese
Taipei, and Hong Kong), based on consumer prices. —
 cThe intra-EMU trade is not considered here whereas it is part of national































aSum of exports and imports relative to GDP in percent.
total trade, in percent. —
 cIn percent. — djnciutimg trade














— "Share of exports to and imports from non-EMU countries in
between Belgium and Luxembourg.
Source: OECD (1998d, 1998e, 1998f); IMF (1998); own calculations.
considerable differences concerning the openness vis-a-vis third countries. For example, Ireland,
Belgium, and Finland are probably more affected by external shocks than the other countries of
Euroland.
As far as the impact of the Asian crisis is concerned, almost all forecasts for 1998 imply that the
economy of the United States will be dampened more than that of Euroland, due to the higher share of
exports to Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia (Gern et al. 1997b: 349). While Euroland's trade share
with Korea and the ASEAN region amounts to only 6.5 percent (Table 2), the respective figure for the





















































aShares of partner countries in Euroland's exports, imports and total trade in percent, derived from special trade statistics in
current US$ prices. — bxjnited Kingdom, *Sweden, Denmark, Greece. — Switzerland, Norway, Iceland. — dinciuding
Hong Kong. —
 eExcluding Japan and China. — ^Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Myanmar, Laos,
Vietnam. — SExcluding Mexico. — "Excluding regionally unspecified trade which is assumed to have the same regional
pattern as specified trade.
Source: OECD (1998d, 1998e); own calculations.10
United States is more than 11 percent. Also, trade with Japan is not as important, the share is only
4 percent. However, Euroland would be affected more than the United States if the countries in
Central and Eastern Europe were hit by a similar crisis. This region has become the third most im-
portant trading partner of Euroland in the past years, following Western Europe and the United States.
The respective share is one-eighth, compared to only 1 percent for the United States. However, we do
not expect that the countries in Central and Eastern Europe will experience a considerable slowdown
of economic growth (Gern et al. 1998).
3 Capacity Utilization Close to Normal
There is an ongoing discussion about the growth rate of potential output in Euroland and consequently
about the size of the output gap. Some observers argue that the rate of capacity utilization is well be-
low normal; therefore, there is no risk of inflation, even more expansionary measures of economic pol-
icy would be appropriate. The alternative view is that the output gap in Euroland has roughly been
closed so that more stimulative measures would run the risk of creating inflationary pressures.
In order to assess the size of the output gap — the difference between actual and trend GDP in per-
cent — we compare five different approaches. One estimate is based on an aggregate production func-
tion. As an approximation, we construct an aggregate of the output gaps for the individual countries
published by the OECD.
7 In another approach, the survey results on capacity utilization in manufac-
turing are used.
8 In the third method, the output gap is defined as the deviation of actual GDP from its
trend which is calculated with the Hodrick/Prescott filter (smoothing factor 1,600). Fourthly, the trend
is approximated by a log-linear deterministic trend, the respective deviations are the values for the out-
put gap. And finally, we use the band-pass filter (Baxter and King 1995). This procedure can be ex-
plained as follows: All changes of real GDP that last between 2 and 32 quarters are defined as business
cycle movements, whereas all other changes are viewed as irregular or trend components.
9
The results of the estimates are presented in Table 3. The deterministic trend postulates, by defini-
tion, a constant growth rate of trend output. The alternative methods lead to very similar results for the
average growth rate of potential output, ranging from 2.1 to 2.3 percent per year for the period 1980-
1998. The estimate based on the surveys cannot be directly compared as they refer to only one sector
of the economy. The methods differ with regard to the smoothness of trend growth, the standard de-
viation varies quite substantially among the series. The most pronounced changes are shown for the
estimates based on the surveys.
As far as the size of the present output gap is concerned, the various methods show considerably
different results. While the gap amounts to 1 percent in the calculation based on the OECD data, the
method using the Hodrick/Prescott filter suggests that capacity utilization is back to normal. The other
two estimates imply a small negative output gap, whereas the survey data show that the rate of
capacity utilization is even above normal. Given these discrepancies, it is necessary to check the
plausibility of the results. The long-run average of the output gap — based on the OECD estimates —
is strongly negative. This is unusual for time periods which are much longer than a complete cycle. Also,
Potential output was calculated using OECD data on real GDP and the output gap. The estimates were transformed into
one currency by using ecu rates. Quarterly data were calculated by the method of linear interpolation.
The measures were weighted by using the shares of national real GDP in total Euroland GDP at constant prices. It has to
be noted that the concepts of the surveys vary across countries. In some cases, the rate of capacity utilization is given di-
rectly, whereas in other countries, the share of those firms producing at or near full capacity is reported. As a con-
sequence, the means of the individual series vary. In order to be able to compare them, the series were standardized.
As moving averages are used, it is necessary — as it is with the Hodrick/Prescott filter — to include a forecast if the
current output gap is to be estimated. The band-pass filter eliminates those fluctuations which have a certain frequency
in an optimal fashion. Baxter and King (1995) show that the filter of HP 1,600 comes very close in the case of quarterly
data. This is also revealed in Figure 5.11
Table 3: Output Gap and Growth of Potential GDP According to Alternative Concepts, 1980-1998 (percent)
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Source: OECD (1998a, 1998b); own calculations and estimations.
it may not be useful to only look at the manufacturing sector. The trend estimates therefore seem to be
more appropriate, and here the deterministic trend can be excluded because it is entirely inflexible.
The more flexible estimates of both the band-pass filter and the Hodrick/Prescott filter are thus prefer-
able. Another disadvantage of the estimates based on a production function (such as by the OECD or
the IMF) is that they often had to be revised ex post. In addition, structural breaks are to be found in
several cases. All in all, it is reasonable to use the Hodrick/Prescott filter as an appropriate measure for
the trend.
The dates of cyclical turning points, however, hardly vary with the method used (Figure 5). All
procedures suggest that the underutilization that had prevailed in 1996 was reduced considerably in
the course of 1997. Thus it is undisputed that Euroland is in the phase of an upswing; the observations
sees a role for an anticyclical monetary policy. This follows also from calculations of the Taylor rule
also suggest that the level of capacity utilization does not signal cyclical tensions. On the other hand, the
Figure 5: Output Gaps in Euroland According to Alternative Methods, 1980-1998

















1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 9812
results cannot be used to justify additional expansionary measures by central banks even if one for
which the output gap is an important variable.
1
0 Even if one assumes the highest negative output gap
of the estimates presented here, the short-term interest rate which is optimal according to the Taylor
rule is substantially higher than the current money market rate in Euroland. Given the time lags of
monetary policy, possible interest rate cuts made now would be effective at a time when capacity
utilization is well above normal. This would raise the risk of an acceleration of inflation.
4 What Is the NAIRU for Euroland?
Unemployment in Euroland is still at a high level although it has come down somewhat since last year.
It is often argued that monetary policy in Europe has been too much oriented at reducing inflation,
while the employment situation in the United States has improved so strongly because the Fed pursued
a more accommodative policy. However, this argument is not correct because the reduction of
inflation in the 1980s and also in the 1990s was not more pronounced in Western Europe than in the
United States (Gern et al. 1997a).
In order to analyze whether there is a relationship between the change of the inflation rate and the
unemployment rate, we refer to the concept of the so-called NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate
of Unemployment). This is the unemployment rate at which there is no change of inflation. Figure 6
shows that there is obviously no stable relationship for Euroland; the unemployment rate at which in-
flation accelerated has shifted to the right since 1981, in other words: The NAIRU has increased. This
result is in contrast to the evidence for the United States, where until the mid-1990s there appeared to
be a fairly stable relationship between the change of inflation and the unemployment rate (Staiger et
al. 1997). Since then, there are indications of an instability; however, it seems that the NAIRU has de-
creased.













b Unemployment rate (percent)
aChange over previous year in percentage points. — ^Own estimates based on Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, and the Netherlands.
Apart from the output gap, the difference between actual and target inflation as well as the equilibrium real short-term
interest rate are used. For more details, see Dopke et al. (1998: 8).13
Box 3: Estimation of NAIRU Equations for Euroland and the United States
A simple NAIRU model (Staiger et al. 1997: 36) is given by
[1] A4n, = n + 0IK,_I + yx, + £,,
where TC denotes the inflation rate, u the unemployment rate and x additional control variables. Given this, the NAIRU can
be expressed as —/x / /3j. Equation [1] is estimated using quarterly data from 1980/1 to 1997/IV. The HWWA raw material
index is chosen as the only additional variable.
For US data, an OLS regression leads to the following results (t-values in brackets):
[2] AAnt = 4.93 - 0.78 K,_, + 2.987T*™™
4 + e,, R
2=0.52.
(6.2) (-6.9) (2.8)
The coefficients imply a NAIRU of 6.3 percent. This is almost the same result found by Staiger et al. However, these
authors note that this point estimate is in line with a confidence interval ranging from by about 4 percent to about 8 percent.
Thus, the results bear a wide margin of uncertainty. Applying the same procedure to Euroland leads to the following
results:
[3] A4n, = 0.74 - 0.11M,..! + 3A5nf
iwWA + e,, R
2=0.24.
(0.8) (-1.3) (4.3)
The coefficients imply a NAIRU by about 6.7 percent. Not surprisingly, the fit is extremely bad. A R
2 comparable to the
one for the US can only be achieved if two dummies are introduced: D\ is 1 for 1983/I-1991/IV, 0 elsewhere and D2 is 1
for 1992/I-1997/IV, 0 elsewhere. The dummies take into account that the relation between the change of the inflation rate
and the unemployment rate shifted to the right during the investigation period (Figure 6).
The results are then as follows:
[4] A4nt = 2.87 - 0.47 «,_i + 3.22n{
/WWA + 1.66 D\ + 2.24 D2 + e, R
2= 0.49.
(2.6) (-3.9) (5.!) (4.6) (4.4)
This implies the following NAIRU estimates for Euroland: 6.1 percent before 1983, 9.6 percent until 1992, and 10.9
percent since then.
The comparison of estimates for the United States and Euroland shows a remarkable difference as
far as the causes of unemployment are concerned. For the United States, cyclical fluctuations can well
be explained as transitory deviations from a — more or less — constant NAIRU. For example, unem-
ployment declines quite quickly to its previous trend level in an upswing. The situation in Euroland is
altogether different: There is no constant value for the NAIRU in the period of investigation, the rate
increases from one cycle to the next. This suggests that the level of structural unemployment has gone
up. The empirical estimates (Box 3) imply that — if at all — only a minor part of the current unem-
ployment is of cyclical nature. Structural unemployment has increased for various reasons, most im-
portantly the insufficient mechanism of the labor market and the social security system, the inflexibil-
ity of wages and — consequently — the failure to sufficiently adjust to structural change (Siebert
1997). Those countries in Euroland which have more actively pursued reforms of the labor market and
the social security system have also been relatively successful as far as employment growth is con-
cerned (Dohse and Krieger-Boden 1998); among these are the Netherlands and Spain. In other coun-
tries, where reforms were made to a much smaller extent, labor market problems have been consider-
ably more pronounced, for example, in France and Germany.
5 Synchronization of Cycles in Euroland?
It is important for economic policy whether the business cycles in the different economies in Euroland
are more or less the same. If this is the case, a common monetary policy is not a special problem for
the currency area. However, a considerable divergence between national cycles might imply that a pol-
icy-oriented at the average situation in Euroland would dampen activity in some countries. This, in14
turn, could lead to pressure on the European Central Bank. However, monetary policy cannot do any-
thing about regional differences. If a more expansionary policy is pursued in Euroland to help some
countries that are lagging behind, the risk of rising inflation for Euroland as a whole emerges.
If the course of the business cycle were solely determined by monetary policy, one should be able to
observe a close convergence over the past years, which should have even increased following the in-
creasing harmonization of monetary policy. However, if supply shocks were more important, there
would be singular movements in specific sectors or regions. For example, a technological innovation
might put a sector under competitive pressure; if it is large enough for a region, economic activity will
be dampened. The importance of such supply shocks is stressed in a number of studies in which the
asymmetric shocks are identified with special time series techniques (e.g. Eble et al. 1997). ^
However, the fact that there is quite a close correlation between the cycles in Euroland countries
suggests a strong influence of monetary policy. It is, furthermore, closer than with countries outside
EMU. This can be demonstrated when the correlation of the output gap of a member country is com-
pared with the rest of Euroland on the one hand and with the United States on the other (Figure 7). If
the estimate is above the 45°-line, the correlation with Euroland is higher; if it is below, the relation-
ship with the United States is closer. The latter is true for the United Kingdom, but also for Finland. In
contrast, the correlation with Euroland is especially high for those countries that have more or less
followed the monetary policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank. It is likely, therefore, that the convergence
of business cycles will increase in the future.
One way to test whether the convergence has already taken place — at least to a certain extent —
before the start of EMU is to look at the standard deviation of the fluctuations around the trend of the
production in manufacturing in all member countries.
1
2 As a comparison, the respective calculation is
made for the core of the DM bloc (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg). Figure 8
shows that the measure of the standard deviation for the DM bloc is a lot smaller than for all of the
EMU members. This suggests that monetary policy is an important source of business cycle fluctua-
tions. This is supported by a closer look at the periods in which there was an increasing or decreasing
correlation. The standard deviation was relatively small in periods in which there was a common ex-
ternal shock as, for example, in 1981 when the effects of the oil price hike were dominant or in
1986/87 when raw material prices plunged. A greater divergence could be observed in times of di-
vergent economic policies; this was true in 1982 when France tried to pursue a strongly expansionary
policy. The standard deviation is extremely high for the period of German unification: While Germany
experienced a tremendous positive output gap, capacity utilization declined in most other countries or
was even negative as in the case of Italy. A crisis in the European Monetary System also typically led
to an increase of the variance. For example, in 1992 the standard deviation remained high although the
boom after unification was coming to an end.
To sum up: A close correlation of the business cycle is likely in Euroland. Important sources that
have led to greater divergencies in the past — exchange rate changes and divergent monetary policies
— are not possible anymore. However, the convergence will not be complete as the experience of the
DM bloc suggests. Therefore, the risk remains that the ECB comes under pressure to pursue a more
expansionary policy in order to alleviate the weakness in individual countries.
Also, the countries may be affected differently by a reduction of external demand. The most recent example is the Asian
crisis.
The analysis of the correlation between percentage changes of real GDP in the five biggest economies of the monetary
union does not reveal an increasing convergence (Dopke et al. 1998: 4). It is possible that a certain convergence is due
to the fact that smaller countries show a bigger correlation with the European cycle.15
Figure 7: Cyclical Synchronization in Euroland, 1985-1997
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Figure 8: Business Cycle Co-Movement in Euroland, 1980-1997 (standard deviation of output gaps in manufacturing in
p.c.)
a
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Calculated using a Hodrick/Prescott filter (1,600). Three-quarter-moving average;'real GDP weights of 1997.16
6 Nonhectic Monetary Policy
With the start of EMU on January 1, 1999, the ECB will be officially in charge of monetary policy in
Euroland. Interest rates have already converged for some time. However, there are still quite sub-
stantial differences as far as short-term rates are concerned. Until the end of 1998, there will have to be
a single money market rate. We expect that this will be the same as the one currently prevailing in the
DM bloc. An interest rate hike in Germany or the other countries is not likely, as the Asian crisis still
has a dampening effect on economic activity and inflation, and as there are hardly any cyclical
tensions. Another reason not to act is the nervousness on financial markets. The relatively high level of
Figure 9: Indicators of Monetary Policy in Euroland, 1980-1998
1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
Short-Term Interest Rate




1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
p.c.
Real Broad Money Stock'a,b
1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
Long-Term Interest Rate
1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
Ecu/US Dollar Exchange Rate
1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
aPercentage change over previous year. — ''Mostly M3; M2 for Italy and Portugal; M4 for Belgium. —
cLong-term interest rate minus short-term interest rate.17
short rates in Portugal, Spain, and Ireland is also due to the strength of economic activity in those
countries. Their central banks will therefore try to keep rates high as long as possible in order to avoid
an overheating. The necessary reduction of interest rates will probably take place only at the end of the
year.
The difference between long-term and short-term interest rates in Euroland has fallen considerably
in the course of this year; this is, however, solely due to the decline of long-term rates. Currently, the
differential is about as high as its average of the past (0.6 percentage points), which can be considered
as reflecting a neutral monetary policy (Dopke et al. 1998: 48). All in all, the stance of policy supports
economic activity. This is indicated by the fact that real Ml has continued to increase rapidly
(Figure 9); the rate even accelerated somewhat since the beginning of 1998, probably due to the de-
cline of short-term interest rates implying lower opportunity costs of holding money. The expansion of
real M3 has also increased but not as strongly as Ml. One reason is that M3 also includes assets which
currently receive only very low interest rates.
The development of inflation, capacity utilization, and the exchange rate will most likely have the
most important impact on the policy of the ECB. Empirical investigations show that this applies to
most major central banks (Solveen 1998). As capacity utilization will rise further in 1999 and as raw
material prices will move up slightly, a small increase of the key interest rate is probable. A strong
tightening, however, is not likely; one reason is that inflation will remain below the target of 2 percent.
The 3-month money market rate will be slightly below 4 % at the end of 1999. Furthermore, we expect
long-term rates to reach some 5 % by the end of 1999; they will thus be about one percentage point
higher than currently. Long-term rates are likely to increase when the safe-haven effect becomes less
important. In addition, with an acceleration of worldwide economic growth, credit demand will also
expand faster contributing to higher interest rates. The yield spread will be above its historical average
next year. All in all, monetary policy will continue to stimulate economic activity in Euroland.
7 On the Strategy of the European Central Bank
In the fall of this year, the ECB will decide on the strategy for monetary policy. It will choose between
monetary targeting and inflation targeting.
1
3 In reality, these two approaches are not as different as
they may seem in theory. The Deutsche Bundesbank, too, has not pursued a strict targeting of the
money stock. For example, the volatility of money growth increased considerably in the 1990s. But
the Bundesbank did not react to short-run changes but focused on reaching the monetary target in the
medium term. In the case of a short-run deviation, the Bundesbank could maintain its credibility by
explaining the policy to the public.
The stability of money demand is an important element in the discussion about the strategy for
monetary policy. We therefore tested a money demand function for Euroland (Box 4). The estimation
does not reveal an instability even for the most recent past. Given this, there is no reason why the ECB
should not formulate a target for the money stock. In doing this, the ECB would benefit from the re-
putation of the Bundesbank and may therefore have a great amount of credibility already at the begin-
ning of EMU. The target for a broad aggregate could be derived as follows: Potential output growth
amounts to some 2.5 percent; the maximum inflation rate which is tolerable is likely to be 2 percent,
and the trend decline of velocity is some 0.5 percent.
1
4 Given these estimates, the ECB should allow
the broad monetary aggregate to expand at a rate of 5 percent per year.
The practice of monetary targeting has often been criticized in the light of an increased volatility of
money growth. It is true that money growth was quite volatile in Euroland, but it is less pronounced
13 For an extensive discussion of both concepts, see Dopke et al. (1998).
1
4 The trend of velocity is calculated for the period between 1983/1 and 1997/1.18
Box 4: On the Stability of Money Demand
The debate on the appropriate monetary strategy for the European Central Bank is essentially a debate whether there exists
a stable money demand function for Euroland. To shed some light on this issue, we estimated a money demand function for
a broad money stock. The ECB will — if a strategy of monetary targeting is adopted — probably prefer a wide aggregate
to a narrow one. We use the concept of cointegration and perform the empirical analysis with an error-correction frame-
work. The sample period covers 1983/11 to 1997/11. Real money demand for M3 (M3r) is modelled by real GDP (Y) as a
transaction or income variable, a short-term interest rate (STR) to account for interest-bearing aggregates of M3 and a long-
term interest rate (LTR) to allow for opportunity costs of holding money (f-statistics in parentheses):
a>b
Am3r = - 1.18 - 0.17 (m3r-l.O8y-0.94STR + 2.35LTR)+ 0.41 4m3r,_, + 0.30 4m3r,_3 - 0.21 AS77?,_2 + 0.41 ALTR
(-2.92) (-4.13) (3.30) (2.39) (-1.70) (2.77)
R
2: 0.59; JB: 1.14 (0.56); LM(1): 0.13 (0.72); LM(4): 1.70 (0.79); ARCH(l): 0.67 (0.41);
ARCH(4): 1.15 (0.89); WHITE: 14.60 (0.48).
c
In a first step, the equation was specified with four lags; then all insignificant variables were dropped. According to the
Banerjee test for cointegration, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level.
This provides strong evidence for a stable long-run money demand function. The coefficients appear to be plausible and
correspond well to the findings of other studies regarding money demand in Euroland and its member countries (see
Browne et al. 1997). We also tested the stability of the model using recursive residuals. Neither the CUSUM nor the
CUSUM Q statistic allows to reject the hypothesis of stable coefficients (5 percent significance level).
aTo date, Eurostat does not provide historical time series for money stocks or interest rates for Euroland. Therefore, we
constructed our own series. For real GDP from 1991 I on we use the NIA data provided by Eurostat (Eurostat 1998), real
GDP from 1983 I to 1990 IV is based on our own estimations. For further details on the data, see Dopke et al. (1998:
65 ff.). — bsmall letters denote logarithms. —
 CA number of misspecification tests were performed: Jarque-Bera test for
normality (JB), Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation (LM 1, LM 4), ARCH test for autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity (ARCH 1, ARCH 4), and the WHITE test for heteroscedasticity (WHITE). The values in parentheses in-
dicate the significance level of the test statistics. Using the conventional 5 percent significance level, the residuals seem to
be "well behaved".
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aDeviation of wide money stocks from its trend level in percent (centered 24-month moving average). Trend calculated with a
Hodrick/Prescott filter.19
than for Germany (Figure 10).
1
5 Therefore, the ECB will hardly face a bigger problem than the Bun-
desbank did in the past.
Also, it is often argued that the transition to EMU will imply a structural break for the demand for
money function. However, the experience of German unification in 1990 shows that the function can
remain stable even in the light of extreme changes. Furthermore, the introduction of the euro is a
longer-term process and not an abrupt shock since financial markets have anticipated the monetary
union for some time. It seems unlikely, therefore, that there will be massive and long-lasting changes
in the demand for cash balances.
8 Efforts to Consolidate Public Finances Are Fading
In 1997, governments in most of the countries that introduce the euro at the beginning of next year
made considerable efforts to reduce public borrowing requirements below the limit of 3 percent of
GDP set in the Maastricht Treaty. This was achieved partly through measures that lowered the deficit
in 1997 only or are associated with an increased burden in the future (Table 4).
1
6 However, the major
part of deficit reduction took place through genuine fiscal tightening; taxes were increased and ex-
penditures were cut. This policy dampened economic activity significantly in 1997.
After the decision on EMU membership, the policy of fiscal consolidation has lost momentum to a
substantial degree. Following the substantial drop in 1997, we expect the general government deficit
as a percentage of GDP for Euroland as a whole to decrease only slightly in 1998. This, however, does
not reflect consolidation efforts, but is due to the cyclical improvement of the economy.
The disretionary fiscal policy impulse is reflected in the development of the structural deficit (for
details on the calculation, see Box 5). The structural deficit will not decline further this year and next
year after a significant decrease in 1997 (Table 5).
1
7 One reason is the absence of one-off measures
that had contributed to the decline last year. At the same time, no additional steps to increase revenues
were taken, in some countries even tax reductions were implemented, albeit on a small scale, and the
tight grip on government expenditures was loosened somewhat. We expect that this will continue in
1999 in the light of the cyclical rise in revenues. As a result, fiscal policy will be more or less neutral
this year and next.
The reversing trend in the development of structural deficits can be observed for the majority of
EMU countries. A continued consolidation of government finances in cyclically adjusted terms is ex-
pected only for Finland and Ireland. However, GDP is surpassing its trend value not only there but
also in a number of other countries. As a consequence, cyclical conditions are favorable for a sustained
fiscal consolidation.
Against the background of the factual halt of efforts to reduce structural deficits further, there is
debate on how this policy is in accordance with the goals formulated in the Maastricht Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact. The Treaty requires a sustainable fiscal position, and the Stability Pact
aims to prevent the deficit ratio from surpassing the 3 percent limit in the course of a normal business
cycle. Therefore, a deficit ratio in the year 1997 below the Maastricht limit is not sufficient.
Empirical investigations for Germany show that the stability of money demand was not severely affected by the increase
of volatility (e.g., Wolters and Liitkepohl 1996).
In France, for example, the budget deficit in the previous year declined because of payments by the France Telecom. In
return, the government accepted pension obligations that will increase expenditures in the future.
^ This judgment also prevails when calculations are based on output gaps estimated by the OECD.20
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Source: EMI (1998); own calculations.
Box 5: Calculation of the Structural Deficit
The structural deficit is defined as the public deficit adjusted for the cyclical component of revenues and expenditures. The
extent to which the deficit is ascribed to the cyclical position depends on the assumed degree of capacity utilization. Ac-
cordingly, the part of the deficit which is judged as structural also depends on the output gap.
In our view, the present cyclical position is reasonably described by the deviation of output from a trend that is calculated
with a Hodrick-Prescott(lO) filter. According to this method, the output gap for Euroland is currently not significant. The
OECD structural deficits, however, still show a considerable underutilization of capacities. In order to calculate structural
deficits that correspond to our view of the cyclical position, the influence of cyclical deviations of output from its trend is
estimated for the period 1980-1999 from OECD data on budget deficits (BD), output gaps (GAP) and structural deficits
(SD) using the simple equation:
[ 1 ] (SD°
ECD -BDt) = b-GAP°
ECD + u,.
The table reports the results for the individual countries (f-values in parentheses). The estimated coefficients are used to





























Source: OECD (1998c); own calculations.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the government can be used to judge the sustainability of the
fiscal position. One indicator is the difference between the current primary deficit and the primary de-
ficit that is necessary to secure government solvency in the long term (Buiter 1985; Blanchard et al.
1990). Calculations based on cyclically adjusted deficits reveal that primary balances in 1997 ex-
ceeded their necessary level in most countries of Euroland (Dopke et al. 1998: pp. 11). However, defi-
cits are still too high in Germany and France. Because these are the two largest countries, the fiscal
position of Euroland as a whole can also not be judged as being sustainable. This is indicated by the
evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio which will hardly decline this year and next despite the continued
upswing of the economy. In cyclically adjusted terms, the debt level is still on the rise.21



























































































































































Source: Europaische Kommission (1998b); own calculations and estimates.
The calculation and evaluation of the primary deficit gap as an indicator of the sustainability of
fiscal policy is problematic for a number of reasons (Home 1991).
1
8 This may be one reason why this
concept has so little influence in the political debate. As an alternative instrument to warrant sound
public finances, provisions were introduced into the Stability and Growth Pact that threaten to impose
sanctions in the case of deficits that exceed 3 percent of GDP. To keep the deficit within this limit
even in a recession, a "safety margin" of 1.5-2 percent of GDP is adequate to allow for cyclical tax
shortfalls and expenditure increases (Scheide and Solveen 1997: 17). Otherwise, fiscal policy would,
for example, have to resort to a procyclical fiscal restraint during a downturn. Hence, to comply with
the requirements of the Stability Pact, structural deficits should not exceed 1-1.5 percent of GDP.
Still more, the Stability and Growth Pact calls for a balanced budget in the medium term, i.e., over a
complete cycle, or even for a small fiscal surplus. While it is not straightforward that a balanced
budget leads to an intertemporal optimization of welfare, there are good reasons to continue fiscal
consolidation decidedly, including the preparation for the burden that is imposed on the public
finances in the future due to the demographic developments.
1
9 However, there is no rule in the
Stability Pact that says how to react when this target is missed. The fact that the reduction of structural
deficits has stopped at levels which often are significantly above 2 percent of GDP points to a low
inclination of governments to work for a balanced budget. Summing up, the current orientation of




Assumptions have to be made on crucial variables like interest rates and growth rates. Also, the public income and ex-
penditure streams, or, at least the development of the balance over time, is exogenous. In addition, it is generally not
considered that the question of fiscal sustainability is also dependent on savings and investment decisions in the private
sector which influence both real interest rates and economic growth. These decisions themselves are not independent
from the private sector's assessment of the fiscal position. Because of this interdependence, the level of public debt that
is to be stabilized is not irrelevant. For instance, the budget balance is particularly sensible to interest rate movements in
countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios.
Social insurance is particularly affected, and there is a pronounced need for reforms despite some recent adjustments
(Gern 1998).22
9 Wage Policy: Increase of Labor Costs Continues to Be Moderate
In 1997, notwithstanding the increase in social security contributions that took place in a number of
countries, wage inflation in Euroland decelerated further to 2.7 percent, following 3 percent and
3.5 percent in 1996 and 1995, respectively.
2
0 At the same time, productivity increases turned out
higher mainly due to the cyclical upturn: Real GDP per employee rose at a considerable faster pace
compared to the previous year (2.6 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively). As a result, unit labor costs
more or less stagnated, which contributed significantly to the moderation of consumer price inflation.
Although there is increased evidence for labor shortages in some countries — among them are
Ireland, Portugal, and the Netherlands — labor costs are not expected to accelerate significantly. The
still high level of unemployment in the majority of the EMU countries is one factor behind this. In
addition, the pace of the upswing is relatively moderate. However, as a somewhat smaller rise in pro-
ductivity is expected, unit labor cost will tend to increase. This acceleration will only be moderate and
will therefore not have a significant impact on inflation and employment growth.
10 Outlook: Upswing Remains Intact
We expect that total output in Euroland will continue to expand markedly until the end of 1999. Real
GDP will rise by nearly 3 percent this year and next (Table 6), which implies a considerable increase
of capacity utilization.
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Source: Eurostat (1998); OECD (1998a); own calculations and estimations.
20 Labor costs in Euroland are measured as gross compensation per employee. Values for individual countries are aggre-
gated using the current central parities in the EMS and the 1996 share of the countries in total gross compensation.23
Figure 11: GDP, Domestic Demand and Net Exports in Euroland, 1991-1999
a
P-c.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
aAt constant prices. — "Percentage change over previous year. —
 cChange of net exports over
previous year in percent of GDP in the same quarter of previous year.
While the pace of the upswing will hardly change, the expansionary forces will increasingly shift
from external to domestic demand (Figure 11). Monetary policy continues to be stimulative over the
forecasting horizon, albeit to a gradually diminishing degree. Fiscal policy is broadly neutral contrary
to previous years when the stance was significantly restrictive. The slight decline in budget deficits is
completely due to cyclical factors. At the same time, export growth will weaken due to the dampening
effects from the Asian and Russian crises and the cyclical deceleration in the United States and the
United Kingdom. The real effective exchange rate of the ecu — and the euro in 1999, respectively —,
which has been on an upward trend since the beginning of this year, is expected to increase slightly.
To summarize, the upswing will increasingly be driven by domestic demand with corporate invest-
ment being particularly buoyant on the back of rising capacity utilization, rapid profit growth, and low






































































































and exchange rates of 1997. —
rates according to OECD. —





























































































— fBased on thenumber
Source: OECD (1998a); own calculations and estimations.24
interest rates. Private consumption will also be brisk, stimulated by an accelerated increase in real
disposable income due to low inflation and an improved labor market. Employment growth, which has
been favorable in many of the smaller countries in the recent past already, will ultimately pick up in
the major countries, too.
In 1998, consumer prices will rise by some 1.5 percent (Table 7) dampened by decreasing import
prices due to falling raw material prices and the appreciation of European currencies. These factors
will slowly fade in the course of 1999, so inflation will pick up somewhat and amount to nearly 2 per-
cent for the year as a whole.25
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